The delivery of treatment and supply solutions for the management of water infrastructure for small and remote communities presents unique challenges. The identification of water quality hazards, the management of risks and conducting plant performance validation and verification activities can all be problematic. The 'Demonstration of Robust Water Recycling' (Robust Recycling) Project was funded by the Australian Water Recycling Centre of Excellence (AWRCoE) and the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) as a means of developing strategies for the provision of small scale water treatment schemes from non-traditional water sources. Using the example of the AAD's Davis Station, this project featured an alternative approach to the establishment of a risk management framework for water recycling. This approach may be applicable to both drinking and recycled water schemes in other small and remote communities.
INTRODUCTION
In Australia over the past decade, the adoption of a 'wholeof-water-cycle' management approach to water security has seen the widespread implementation of a range of alternative water supply schemes. However, applying this same approach to small and remote communities greatly mag- W C to ensure optimal operating conditions for process control, and to protect it from the harsh weather conditions experienced in the Antarctic. The AWTP will be capable of producing high quality treated water with the objectives of significantly reducing the quantity and environmental impact of ocean discharges and providing a source of reuse water for station activities. The treatment facilities and associated reuse applications will also provide a demonstration of water recycling and reuse capabilities for small scale and remote applications, such that it might find application at other locations.
Due to the remoteness of the location, and the logistical difficulties of providing suitable staff and equipment, essential requirements for the advanced water treatment plant (AWTP) include the following:
• A high level of automation and the capacity for the plant to be monitored and controlled remotely, with minimal onsite operator intervention.
• Extra-high credible log reduction values (LRVs) for pathogen removal (Barker et al. ) .
• Minimal manual maintenance and chemical dosing requirements.
• A reliable functional Recycled Water Quality Risk Management Plan (RWQRMP).
The project team, comprising representatives from the AAD, academia and industry, came together in mid-2012.
They were tasked with the design, build, commissioning and operation of the Davis AWTP. Initial scoping, HAZOP, detailed design and construction occurred over a two-year period from 2012 to 2014. The plant was then relocated to TasWater's Self's Point Wastewater treatment plant (SPWWTP) in Hobart, Tasmania. Process optimisation and validation studies were carried out at Self's Point for around 12 months using a secondary treated wastewater effluent as a feedwater source.
The final objective will be installation, commissioning and implementation of the AWTP at Davis Station in 2017-2018. 
Challenges for risk management

MATERIAL AND METHODS
Risk management framework and RWQRMP development
The formal risk management framework used to develop the RWQRMP followed relevant Australian national guidelines, which form the basis of the water-related regulation used by Australian states and territories:
• AGWR: Managing Health and Environmental Risks (Phase 1) (NRMMC, EPHC, NHMRC ) (AGWR Phase 1);
• AGWR: Managing Health and Environmental Risks (Phase 2) (NRMMC, EPHC, NHMRC ) (AGWR Phase 2); and;
• Australian Drinking Water Guidelines (NHMRC )
The aspects of the RWQRMP that were specifically developed by the project team during this phase of the project are detailed below.
Water supply system risk assessment (Element 2 of AGWR Phase 1)
The project team applied the Hazard Identification and
Critical Control (HACCP) principles to the water supply system analysis and risk assessment process. A specialist team was assembled to conduct a water supply system analysis. This included key AAD employees, and academic and industry partners with a broad range of relevant scientific, technical and operational knowledge, experience and expertise.
The identification of the hazards likely to exist in the source water, or that could occur, or be present, at each of the system process steps, was based upon the following information:
• A quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) to determine the pathogen reduction requirements for possible potable reuse at Davis Station (Barker et al. ) .
• Water quality data from samples collected from a number of locations within the Davis Station wastewater system during the summer expedition of 2013/2014.
• First hand working station knowledge provided by the AAD personnel attending the workshop.
• Manifests of compounds taken to Antarctic stations by AAD.
• Expert opinion and knowledge provided by the scientific and technical workshop attendees experienced in the fields of water treatment and water quality. Based upon the risk assessment information critical control points (CPPs) for the system were identified as per the required criteria set out by the AGWR Phase 1. Any process or activity within the system that did not specifically meet the criteria for a CCP, but were still considered an important operational/process step to ensuring the quality of the final product, were termed quality control points (QCPs). The critical limits and target criteria for each CPP were developed and tested during process validation and verification period at SPWWTP. 
Robustness criteria and analysis
The reliability and robustness of the AWTP was assessed against a set of pre-formed criteria ( Table 1 ). The conclusions from the work are based on demonstrated results from the trial and an analysis of likely differences between the trial case and when the plant is located at Davis Station.
In addition, further challenge testing was conducted for bromide and iodide treatment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Risk assessment outcomes
The outcomes of the risk assessment demonstrated that the highest ranking risk was the health risk posed by pathogenic microorganisms in the source water. This was followed by a range of chemical compounds derived from products used to conduct station activities, for example:
• volatile organic carbons;
• pharmaceutical products/metabolites;
• Chemicals of Concern (CoCs) (considered broadly at this stage of the project as carcinogens, endocrine disruptors and hormones);
• heavy metals; and • hydrocarbon compounds.
Hazardous events identified included a gastroenteritis outbreak (affecting at least one third of the station popu- The risk assessment identified the key points within the system at which control can be applied to reduce water quality risks. These points were drafted into one QCP plan and six CCP plans. These plans form a critical element of the RWQRMP. These were trialled during the proxy site demonstration operation at the SPWWTP.
Process validation and verification
A key output for the project specified by the AWRCoE was to 'develop robust recycling designs and concepts for plant operations' for small and remote communities. An essential element to ensuring the delivery of a robust system is plant performance validation and verification. This stage of the project required resources that were impractical for Davis Station; for example, access to specialist technical expertise, maintenance support, equipment and analytical facilities.
The use of the proxy site at the TasWater SPWWTP, as a demonstration operation, has allowed the performance Remote operation The plant should be able to be started and stopped, as well as be operated and monitored, from a remote location.
The AWTP is judged to meet the criterion to be able to be operated remotely.
Auto start/stop The AWTP should be able to operate on a batch basis, such that it starts and stops automatically, in order to satisfy the treatment of the variable wastewater flows from the secondary treatment plant.
The plant is judged to meet the criterion to be able to start and stop automatically and operate in batch mode to cater for seasonal variations in feed volumes.
Unskilled local operation
Local operation of the AWTP should be possible, using personnel with a good operational knowledge of the AWTP, but having qualifications in the plumbing and electrical trades and not expertise in water treatment.
In the first 12 months' operation, the plant did not meet the criterion that it could be operated for an extended period whereby intervention from highly skilled personnel would not be required. It was recommended that the plant be operated for a further trial period to reduce fault types that would require skilled intervention.
Low risk of nonconforming water
Product water from the AWTP should have an extremely low risk of non-conformity with the AGWR and wastes from the plant should show an extremely low risk of being harmful to the marine environment.
The water quality of the product and discharge streams of the plant met the requirements for potable water, as laid out in the AGWR, and the discharge is safe for the marine environment.
Low chemical/ energy use
The AWTP should be able to operate with a reduced chemical inventory and at an energy cost that is comparable to, or better than, other sources of potable quality water (i.e. desalinated water). The energy use should be significantly better than current AAD operations.
The AWTP was judged to be of low chemical inventory.
The energy use of the plant was judged to be significantly less than current AAD operations for the production of potable water.
Long plant lifetime The AWTP should be designed to operate for 20þ years, using piping and componentry that is able to withstand the rigours of transport and saline, chemical and marine environments.
A number of the fixtures in the AWTP were considered not to meet the criterion that the plant should be able to operate for 20þ years. It is recommended that components not meeting this criterion be replaced with materials of higher specification or with a more appropriate material. These validation results suggest that the demonstration plant is technically able to achieve the desired water qualities. Further operation and water quality testing has continued beyond the conclusion of the Robust Recycling project, to confirm the reliability of the AWTP for producing suitable quality water.
Robustness criteria and analysis
A trial period of investigation (August 2014 to June 2015 was undertaken where the objective was to demonstrate that the AWTP can meet the robustness criteria designated by the AAD. These criteria are outlined in Table 1 . The main outcomes, up to July 2015, are also outlined in 
Policy-based risk management framework
A Davis Station RWQRMP was developed for the AWTP.
The purpose of the RWQRMP is to ensure the AWTP plant produces water that is fit for purpose. That purpose is to meet the environmental requirements for the outfall for Davis Station wastewater treatment process and to potentially provide options for alternative recycled water end-uses. The structure and content of the RWQRMP has been prepared in accordance with the AGWR, phases 1 and 2 (NRMMC EPHC NHMRC , ).
However, to develop an operational RWQRMP, assurance is needed that the identified risks will be adequately controlled and managed. This requires the risk uncertainty to be reduced. This was particularly the case for chemical risks. In the absence of, or the inability to conduct, a detailed water quality assessment, one approach is to focus effort upon the establishment of a strong recycled water policy commitment, along with the development of detailed management processes and procedures designed to ensure treatment performance capabilities. Importantly, the policy and management strategies are strongly focused on source water input control, such as:
• approved chemical/products inventory and chemical change management processes;
• chemical management procedures, i.e. onsite storage, handling and usage, spill response and containment;
• the implementation of onsite waste management procedures; and
• products for return to Australia procedures (or generically off-site disposal procedures).
The risk management strategies outlined above are sup- applicable to CoCs removal. Out of the AWTP seven process barriers, the study found that two could be designated as CCPs (Scales et al. a) . These are the RO and ozone barriers. These were determined using the operational data from the SPWWTP trials (Gray et al. a) . 
CONCLUSIONS
Arising from this project were four key aspects in the risk management approach: adoption of a strong, policy-based, risk management framework, water supply system risk assessment, process validation and verification, and robustness criteria and analysis.
This project has demonstrated that it is possible to develop a risk management framework in the absence of large water quality and process data sets. In this case, the approach is the establishment of a strong safe water quality policy commitment. Importantly, the policy and management strategies are strongly focused on source water input control.
In contrast to a water quality system assessment conducted by a large urban or regional water utility, the physical isolation and compactness of remote supply systems make them unique. AAD personnel, with first hand operational knowledge, provided the key information source required to construct a 'catchment-to-tap' hazard and risk profile.
An essential element to ensuring the delivery of a robust system is plant performance validation and verification. One approach is the use of a proxy site and/or demonstration operation. This enables the performance validation and verification stages to occur at a location which has full access to the resources required, and then for the validated and/or verified processes to be installed at the remote site.
Finally, the plant robustness criteria were developed based upon interviews/consultation with local operations staff, supervisors, engineers and managers. This allowed for customisation of the Robustness Assessment to address the specific needs of the operation.
